Optical and near-optical band communication systems are known to be intrinsically more secure than comparable RF channels, due to their narrow beamwidths and, in some cases, their high atmospheric absorption. The use of coding against wiretapping for such channels is investigated. For the degraded Poisson wiretap channel model, the secrecy capacity is determined exactly. Moreover, a complete characterization of the rate-equivocation region is presented. For achievability, an optimal code is constructed explicitly by using a code designed by Wyner for the Poisson channel. The converse is proved in two ways: the first method leverages the low-SNR nature of the channel and relies only on simple properties of conditional expectation and classical information inequalities. The second method uses a link recently established between minimum mean square error estimation and mutual information over Poisson channels.
I. INTRODUCTION
L IKE all design problems, constructing a communication system requires selecting from among several possible technologies by weighing their relative merits. The criteria of this comparison are well known: data rate; cost; complexity; bandwidth; reliability, both as a measure of fidelity and longevity; power; and latency. These parameters have received considerable attention within the context of classical communications engineering, and they are now reasonably well understood for most point-to-point communication scenarios.
More recently, security has been added to the list of criteria by which communication systems are evaluated. This is especially true in the context of wireless communication, which, when compared to wireline communication, is evidently more prone to casual eavesdropping. Security might appear to be a misplaced requirement of a communication system, because existing cryptographic protocols can always be added to any system that provides basic communication functionality. But these protocols are not provably secure, so there is no guarantee that they will not be broken in the future. At the same time, it is now recognized that communication systems themselves can provide intrinsic security even without the use of conventional cryptography. For instance, the transmitter can beamform to Manuscript the intended receiver [1] , channel randomness can be used for secret key generation [2] , and coding can be employed to ensure that only a negligible amount of information is leaked to an eavesdropper [3] - [10] . We shall call the last of these techniques wiretap coding.
It is well recognized that wireless communication systems operating in the optical and near-optical band are intrinsically more secure than those operating in the radio-frequency (RF) band. Infrared (IR) systems are very amenable to beamforming [11] , and some ultraviolet (UV) systems experience high atmospheric attenuation, which enables secure short-range communication by guaranteeing that eavesdroppers beyond a certain distance are kept in the dark. Indeed, secure IR systems based on these advantages have been demonstrated [12] , [13] and UV systems are under development [14] , [15] .
Near-optical systems may also be more amenable to wiretap coding, in the sense that, compared with RF systems, near-optical systems are arguably more likely to satisfy the assumptions necessary for wiretap coding to be useful. For wiretap coding to provide secrecy against eavesdropping, one must ensure that the chosen data rate is below the secrecy capacity of the channel. Lower bounding the secrecy capacity in turn requires at least partial knowledge of the eavesdropper's channel law. Indeed, to establish a positive secrecy capacity, one must ensure that the eavesdropper's channel law is not better than, or even the same as, the legitimate user's.
As the eavesdropper obviously will not report her channel law, this information must be obtained in other ways. One way is to use information about her possible position, such as that she is known to be farther away than the legitimate receiver. For RF channels with multipath fading, however, it can be difficult to map information about the eavesdropper's position to information about her channel. Multipath fading makes the strength of the channel a sensitive function of position, so the eavesdropper's channel can be inferred only if very precise information is available about her position and the fading environment around her. Even if the eavesdropper is known to be farther away than the legitimate receiver, multipath fading could result in her channel being statistically stronger. Making matters worse the eavesdropper can even control her fading by moving around to find the strongest possible signal. Of course, not all RF channels are subject to multipath fading, but even the possibility that multipath might be present makes it difficult to provide guarantees on the relative strengths of the legitimate receiver's and the eavesdropper's channel.
In the near-optical band, these issues are ameliorated by the fact that multipath fading is negligible [11] . Such systems are still prone to fading, but this fading is due to turbulence rather than multipath [23] , [24] . As such, it is not a sensitive function of position nor can it be controlled by the eavesdropper to the extent that multipath fading can. This makes it easier to map information about the possible position of the eavesdropper to information about her channel. In this sense, near-optical band systems are more amenable than RF systems to wiretap coding.
Despite this apparent advantage, relatively little is known about how to perform wiretap coding for near-optical systems. We examine the fundamental limits of coding for secure communication over optical channels by studying the secrecy capacity of the Poisson channel, a common model for direct detection optical communications systems. In such systems, the transmitter sends information by modulating the intensity of an optical signal while the receiver observes the arrival moments of individual photons. The capacity of this channel has been determined under peak power constraint on the transmitted optical power by Kabanov [16] and under both average and peak power constraints by Davis [17] . Wyner [18] derived the reliability function of this channel for all rates below capacity and constructed exponentially optimal codes. Multiple-access Poisson channels were studied in [19] and [20] whereas broadcast Poisson channels were considered in [21] and [22] . The capacity of the Poisson channel has also been investigated in the presence of fading [24] .
We study in this paper the degraded Poisson wiretap channel. The legitimate receiver observes a doubly stochastic Poisson process with instantaneous rate where is the signal transmitted. The eavesdropper's observation is also a doubly stochastic Poisson process with instantaneous rate . For degradedness we assume that 1 and . In Theorem 1, we provide a closed-form expression of the secrecy capacity as a function of the parameters , . This result is further extended by Theorem 5 which gives a full characterization of the rate equivocation region.
Our achievability proof uses stochastic encoding as well as the structured codes constructed by Wyner for the Poisson channel [18] . As for the converse, we will see that the infinite bandwidth nature of the Poisson channel makes it possible to prove the converse using only simple properties of the conditional expectation combined with basic information theoretical inequalities. This is to be contrasted with the converse of the (finite bandwidth) Gaussian channel which is proved using the entropy power inequality (EPI) [25] or the worst additive noise result developed in [26] . As an illustration for the basic ideas that underpin the converse for the Poisson channel, we will start by considering here the more familiar infinite bandwidth Gaussian channel and we will see also that for this channel the proof of the converse simplifies considerably.
For this purpose, consider the continuous time Gaussian wiretap channel with bandwidth (later we will let tend to infinity) and with a power constraint . This continuous time channel is equivalent to uses per second of the discrete time Gaussian channel depicted in Fig. 1 . The input signal is power constrained, i.e., , the legitimate receiver observes and the eavesdropper receives , where and .
Define by
and observe that (1) where . It is easy to see that and
; it follows, therefore, that (since they are jointly Gaussian). For the discrete time Gaussian wiretap channel, it is known that the secrecy capacity is given by . For the continuous time channel counterpart with bandwidth , the secrecy capacity becomes . In [25] , using the celebrated EPI, a closed-form expression for the secrecy capacity of the discrete time Gaussian wiretap channel was obtained. In just a few steps, we will see that the secrecy capacity of the infinite bandwidth Gaussian wiretap channel can be found much more simply. Starting with (1), we obtain the following sequence of inequalities:
Inequality follows from the data processing inequality, equalities in and are standard information theory identities, follows from the independence bound on entropy, and finally holds because and are conditionally independent given (i.e., ). Basically, the key identity needed to go from to is the following: if , then we have . A proof of this simple inequality in a more general setting will be given later and will be used in part of the converse for the Poisson channel. Going back to the Gaussian problem, we see that
For a fixed bandwidth , this last inequality is not tight. But letting we obtain
However, since (6) we also have that
It follows that . This remarkably simple approach will be useful for the Poisson channel. More specifically, when , the eavesdropper's signal is a thinned version of the legitimate receiver's signal , i.e., 2 where ; the aforementioned approach gives that . Since is itself a doubly stochastic Poisson process, the mutual information can be maximized using the martingale techniques of Kabanov [16] and an (achievable) upperbound can be obtained on . When , a different bounding technique using only simple properties of the conditional expectation will be devised.
Although no "sophisticated" tools are required to prove the converse, we show in the appendix that using some new results in information theory an alternative proof can be provided. This different proof hinges on the link that has been established between the mutual information (MI) and the minimum mean square estimation (MMSE) in Poisson channels [27] . It is worth noting at this point that the link between the MI and the MMSE in the Gaussian setting [28] has been also used recently for different Gaussian wiretap channels [29] , [30] .
One of the distinctive aspects in this paper is that we do not resort to the -discretization method introduced by Wyner [18] . This method was used to approximate the Poisson channel by a binary DMC thereby allowing the transposition of the widely known results for DMCs to the Poisson channel. This technique leads to extensive computations, especially when we are interested in the secrecy capacity as there are now two conflicting objectives involved, the maximization of the information rate at the legitimate receiver and the minimization of the information leakage at the eavesdropper. We circumvent the use of this method by using the techniques described previously.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the setup of the problem and presents the main result of this paper as well as some interpretations of the obtained result. The proof of the achievability of the secrecy capacity is given in Section III and the proof of the converse is presented in Section IV. In Section V we extend the main result of the paper by giving a complete characterization of the rate-equivocation region. Finally, in Section VI, some possible future directions are discussed.
II. PROBLEM AND RESULT STATEMENT
The input process to the Poisson channel is a waveform denoted by satisfying for all . We further assume that the input process is peak power limited, i.e., for all . The received signal at the legitimate receiver is a doubly stochastic Poisson process with instantaneous 2 The time dependence has been dropped to ease the notations. Refer to the converse part of the paper for a mathematically precise statement. 
rate
, i.e., given the stochastic process has independent increments with and for we have where The parameter accounts for possible signal attenuation at the receiver. The parameter is the dark current intensity which results from background noise and bears no information on the input process . Similarly, the output process of the eavesdropper is a doubly stochastic Poisson process with instantaneous rate . In this paper, the space of doubly stochastic Poisson processes on the interval will be denoted by . Following the notation used in [27] , the output process of the Poisson channel in the interval with instantaneous rate will be denoted by . We use to designate , as such refers to the causal conditional mean estimate and to the noncausal one. All stochastic processes considered in this paper are defined on a common measurable space . We use to denote the internal history generated by the process .
In this paper, we are interested in the degraded Poisson wiretap channel. Lapidoth et al. [21] gave conditions on the parameters , for stochastic degradedness. These conditions are presented in the following lemma. In order to prepare for the results to come, we will also briefly go over the proof of this lemma.
Lemma 1 ([21]):
The eavesdropper's channel is stochastically degraded with respect to the legitimate receiver's channel, if (9) and (10) Proof: Let (cf., Fig. 2 ) be the process defined as follows: 3 (11) where is a homogeneous Poisson process with rate [note that by (10)] independent of . It follows that is a doubly stochastic Poisson process with instantaneous rate . The process is then obtained from by thinning with erasure probability (note that because of (9), this quantity is ).
In the rest of this paper, we will assume that at least one of the inequalities (9) or (10) is strict. Note that this assumption can be made without losing generality for if there was an equality in (9) and (10), then the legitimate receiver's channel and the eavesdropper's channel will be identical and the secrecy capacity will be zero.
We move now to the description of the information transmission aspect of the problem. The transmitter wishes to communicate a message uniformly distributed on . An code for the Poisson wiretap channel is a stochastic encoder that maps a message to a waveform which satisfies the peak power constraint and a decoder . The transmission rate of this code is
The average probability of error at the legitimate receiver is
The level of secrecy in this paper is measured by . This normalized MI quantifies the rate of the information leaked to the eavesdropper about the message . As such our goal is to make this quantity as small as possible.
Definition: A secrecy rate is said to be achievable 4 for the Poisson wiretap channel if for all and all sufficiently large , there exists an code such that (13) 4 Equivalently, we say that is achievable with perfect secrecy.
The supremum of achievable secrecy rates will be called the secrecy capacity. The main result of this paper is the following.
Theorem 1: The secrecy capacity of the degraded Poisson wiretap channel is given by 5 (14) where is the unique solution in to the following equation: (15) This result assumes that is known to the transmitter. Yet, it follows that is an achievable rate with perfect secrecy even if the eavesdropper observes , where and are unknown but satisfy and . 6 Thus, only one-sided estimates of and are needed. In practice, an upper bound on could be provided by guaranteeing that any potential eavesdropper is more than a certain distance away from the transmitter. A lower bound on the dark current could be provided using ambient noise measurements and the known physical limitations of existing receivers. Fig. 3 depicts the secrecy capacity versus for and . As expected, the secrecy capacity is a decreasing function of . When , the secrecy capacity is equal to the capacity of the main channel and it then decreases until it reaches zero when . Worst Case Scenario: A particularly insightful case is when . This situation happens when the eavesdropper 5 If , the convention is that . 6 If where and are unknown but satisfy and , then, from Lemma 1, can be viewed as a degraded version of . This means that and a fortiori . observes a thinned version of the signal of the legitimate receiver, i.e., in (11) . In this case, after some algebraic manipulations, we obtain that (16) and the secrecy capacity reduces to (17) This is saying that the secrecy capacity is the difference between the capacity of the main channel (the channel between the transmitter and the legitimate receiver) and the capacity of the eavesdropper's channel. For instance, in the special case when there is no dark current , we find that and the secrecy capacity reduces to (18) For a degraded DMC, Wyner [3] showed that the secrecy capacity is equal to . Hence, the following inequality is always satisfied:
where is the capacity of the main channel and is the capacity of the eavesdropper's channel. As shown in [31] and [32] , there is equality in the inequality above if there is an input probability distribution that simultaneously maximizes and . This is exactly what is happening here; when , the mutual information and are both maximized by letting the input cycle infinitely fast between its extreme values, i.e., the peak power 1 and 0 with . In order to achieve this limit, the communication bandwidth must become very large. However, we are assuming here that this bandwidth is still negligible compared to the optical center frequency at which the communication system is operating. If this is no longer the case, then the channel model that we are using is no longer appropriate.
Before we proceed further with the presentation of the problem considered in this paper, we give a lemma that will prove to be useful in the proofs of the achievability and the converse; a proof of this result can be found for instance in [16] .
Lemma 2:
The MI between the input and the output can be upper bounded as follows: 7 (19) where .
III. ACHIEVABILITY OF
Our achievability proof relies on the structured codes that were designed for the Poisson channel by Wyner [18] . As pointed out by one of the reviewers, an alternative proof can 7 Note that some authors use the function instead but the constant term cancels out here.
be obtained by restricting the input process to the channel to be a piecewise constant binary waveform and using the lower bound on the secrecy capacity derived in [33] and [34] . Before delving into the details of the proof, we will briefly describe the code construction and the properties inherited by this code. 
For fixed, these codes satisfy (21) with being the Lebesgue measure. If moreover , for , Wyner showed that for (22) As such for large enough, the codewords will behave as if they were chosen independently.
After this brief overview of Wyner codes, we are in a position to state the achievability theorem and prove it. 
After few algebraic manipulations, we can show that Given these parameters, the encoder-decoder pair considered here works as follows.
Encoding: Let and let be uniformly distributed on . Define and following the steps described previously construct a code 8 . Partition this code arbitrarily into smaller subcodes, i.e.,
. The cardinality of each each subcode will be equal to . The encoder works as follows: when the message is chosen, the codeword is selected uniformly randomly from . Notice that every subcode can be viewed as a code for the eavesdropper's channel with codewords and a uniform prior distribution. The method used to build mimics the construction used by Wyner in his original paper [3] , where a code for the main channel is obtained by combining an appropriate number of subcodes that achieve the rate with vanishing error probability over the eavesdropper's channel.
Decoding: The decoder considered here is the maximum likelihood decoder constructed by Wyner [18] . After observing , the decoder at the legitimate receiver computes the following metric: (24) where . Then if maximizes , with ties resolved in favor of the smallest . Analysis of : The fact that follows simply from the fact that Wyner codes with the peak power 1 and average power are capacity achieving for the main channel.
Analysis of
: Notice first that for each , the waveform is piecewise constant. It follows that a sufficient statistic for making a decision is the number of arrivals during each subinterval , i.e., , , with . Consequently,
and (26) where , or 1 depending on the choice of the codeword, and . The aforementioned equalities follow from the fact that is a sufficient statistic. Now, using the Markov chain , we can write that (27) or, equivalently (28) We will consider each of the terms in the aforementioned equality separately. First, as a result of Lemma 2, we have (29) where . Because of the uniform choice in the encoding scheme and in view of (21), we must have that ; hence, we have (30) and (31) Consequently, from (25), we deduce that (32) As stated before, every subcode can be viewed as a code for the eavesdropper's channel. Since the codewords are uniformly distributed in each subcode, we deduce that . This leads to (33) Define to be the probability of error for code with the (optimal) decoder described above. By the aforementioned code construction, the codewords of every subcode satisfy (21) and (22) (with replaced by ). These two conditions dictate the pairwise error probability of the codewords in [18] . Since the overall error probability of the code is governed by the pairwise error probability [18] , it follows that the error probability can be made arbitrarily small for every subcode . Now, from Fano's inequality we have (34) where is the binary entropy. Let . Averaging over and by using the concavity of , we find that (35) Combining (28), (32) , (33) , and (35) , results in (36) Using (26) and the fact that , we obtain (37) Since can be made arbitrarily small, we can enforce that by choosing large enough. The previous inequality shows, therefore, that and the desired secrecy condition is satisfied.
This shows that any secrecy rate can be achieved and completes the achievability proof.
IV. CONVERSE FOR THE SECRECY CAPACITY
Before delving into the details of the converse, we need the following technical lemma due to [35] .
Lemma 3 ([35]):
If is a random variable such that is a finite set and is a given stochastic process, then we have (38) where is the usual entropy for discrete random variables and (39) This lemma is standard when all the random variables have discrete alphabets; however, this extension is needed in this paper since we are dealing with continuous time stochastic processes.
The converse theorem will be proved through a sequence of lemmas. The first one gives an inequality that must satisfied by every encoder-decoder pair . This lemma can be proved by using Kolmogorov's formula and the Markov chain . We omit the proof here because it is a standard result in information theory.
The goal of the upcoming lemmas is to prove that , where is given by (14) . We first decompose as follows:
where has been defined in (11) . The next two lemmas will provide upper bounds on and .
Lemma 6: If
, then (45) 9 The data processing inequality extends to arbitrary random variables; see for instance [35, Th. 3.4] . 10 The definition of the conditional MI for arbitrary random variables can be found in [35] .
where and has been defined above analogously.
Proof: Note first that [16] , [36] ( 46) and (47) where . Consequently, using the fact that and after simplifications, we deduce the following:
Recall that , where is a homogeneous Poisson process independent of . Clearly, , with being the smallest sigma-field containing . From the independence of from , using the law of redundant conditioning (see, e.g., [36, pp. 281-282] ), we deduce that (49)
We can now establish the following sequence of identities:
where follows from (49), follows from the smoothing property of the conditional expectation, from Jensen's inequality applied to the convex function , and from the fact that and the smoothing property. We deduce, therefore, that
A simple derivation shows that the function is convex as
Now invoking again Jensen's inequality, we obtain that (56)
Using this last inequality and after rearranging the terms, we obtain the desired result, i.e.,
An alternative proof of this lemma using the link provided in [27] between the MMSE and the MI in Poisson channels is given in Appendix A.
Proof: Recall that was obtained from by thinning with erasure probability . Let the process denote those points that were erased; hence, we have that is a doubly stochastic Poisson process with instantaneous rate . Moreover, and are independent given . We proceed with the proof of the lemma by showing that the following inequality holds:
Indeed, notice first that is a Markov chain; hence, from the data processing inequality we deduce that (60) Consider now two partitions of , and . Define two discrete random variables and on as follows: if and if . The mutual information can be computed as [35] (61) where the supremum is taken over all such partitions of . We proceed to prove (59) as follows:
where follows from Lemma 3 (Wyner's lemma) applied to the random variable , is also a direct instance of this lemma. Inequality is the independence bound on the entropy (which holds here since the random variables and are discrete). Equality results from the fact that and are conditionally independent given , indeed whereas and and are conditionally independent given . Consequently, we have (63)
Combining the last inequality with (60), we deduce that 11 (64) Now using Lemma 2, we have An alternative proof of this lemma using the link provided in [27] between the MMSE and the MI in Poisson channels is given in Appendix B. and , we deduce that . Moreover due to the assumption that at least one of 11 Note that since , then and hence the inequality is well defined. the inequalities (9) or (10) is strict, we conclude that (for ) and is strictly convex. Notice now that we have (71) where follows from fixing and maximizing over all distributions on with mean . Equality follows from the convexity of (refer to [16] and [37] ), i.e., the maximizing distribution puts all the mass on the extremes and since the mean is , the maximizing assigns the mass to 1 and to 0. The maximization of the last term shows that the optimal is the unique solution to the equation which, after some algebraic manipulations, gives that is the solution to (15) . The existence of follows simply from the mean value theorem, whereas the uniqueness is a consequence of the strict monotonicity of . Consequently, the following is true:
This fact when combined with (69) gives the result announced in the theorem.
We are now in a position to prove the converse theorem. The following theorem gives the rate equivocation region (that is the set of all achievable rate-equivocation pairs ) for the degraded Poisson Wiretap channel. 
To ease the notations, using the functions and , we can rewrite the first two inequalities as and . Proof: The main ingredients needed to prove this theorem has been already used to obtain the secrecy capacity. More specifically, for the achievability proof we will use stochastic encoding combined with Wyner codes for the Poisson channel, and for the converse we will use the key inequality (69) established by Lemmas 6 and 7.
A. Direct Result
Note first that for a fixed rate , if the rate equivocation pair is achievable then the pair is achievable for all . Hence, in order to establish the direct result, it is enough to prove that any rate-equivocation pair satisfying , , and for some is achievable.
Define (79)
Let be arbitrary (small enough) and let with and . The message to be transmitted is selected uniformly randomly from with . Define and, following the steps described for the achievability of the secrecy capacity, construct the Wyner code . Partition this code arbitrarily into smaller subcodes, i.e.,
. The cardinality of each subcode will be equal to . Notice that with this choice of parameters we have (80)
The probability of error of the legitimate receiver can be made less than because the Wyner code can achieve the rate . The equivocation of the code can be lower bounded using the same steps used to established the upper bound on for the secrecy capacity, as follows:
In the above, inequality follows from (36) and where is the probability of error for the code with the (optimal) decoder described previously.
As was discussed before, the term can be made less than for large enough, which means that (85) This establishes that the rate-equivocation pair is achievable.
B. Converse
For every code with rate and equivoca- Now since is arbitrary, letting yields the desired result.
VI. DISCUSSION
We have derived the secrecy capacity and characterized the rate-equivocation region of the degraded Poisson wiretap channel. Several interesting problems remain open and deserve further investigation. One is the nondegraded Poisson Wiretap channel. One can imagine a situation in which the eavesdropper is equipped with a powerful detector characterized by a negligible dark current (i.e.,
). If the detector of the legitimate receiver has a higher received power from the transmitter but is more prone to dark current, then the channel will not be degraded. This is a practically important situation but is not covered by the results of this paper. While the code construction used here would certainly give an achievable secrecy rate, determining the secrecy capacity is much more challenging in the nondegraded case. The difficulty is that, unless the legitimate user's channel is less noisy than the eavesdropper, finding the secrecy capacity requires optimizing over an auxiliary random variable [4] , which complicates the analysis. One possible approach is to approximate the Poisson channel by a binary DMC [18] . In principle, one could then apply the classical result for the secrecy capacity of nondegraded DMCs [4] and take limits. This procedure seems to be quite onerous, however.
Another issue that we have not addressed is fading. As mentioned in Section I, for wireless optical communications, atmospheric turbulence can induce random fluctuations of the intensity of the transmitted light beam [24] . This impairment has received considerable attention in the context of reliable communications, and it would be useful to determine its effect on secrecy.
MIMO Poisson channels have received some interest lately (see [38] and references therein), and as has been done in the Gaussian setting, it would be interesting to see the impact of having multiple antennas on the secrecy capacity in the Poisson regime.
We believe that the results derived in this paper and the tools used to derive them could be used to address these problems.
APPENDIX A MMSE PROOF FOR LEMMA 6
In this appendix, we provide an alternative proof for Lemma 6. This proof uses the link established in [27] between the MMSE and the MI in Poisson channels. Note first that since , we have that is differentiable and [27, Th. 3] Since the function is concave, using Jensen's inequality and the iterative conditioning property we have Making use of this inequality and the fact that , we deduce that (96) where we have also invoked Fubini's theorem to make the necessary exchanges between the integrals and the expectation operator. The desired inequality is then obtained after some algebraic manipulations using the elementary identity (97)
APPENDIX B MMSE PROOF FOR LEMMA 7
Here, we provide an alternative proof for Lemma 7. For ease of notations, define . Using [27, Th. 4] , we obtain that (98) where the second equality is obtained after some simplifications using the identity . Now by the convexity of the function , Jensen's inequality gives (99) It follows, therefore, that (100) Clearly, we have that . Also, we have that and . Consequently (101) Using the previous inequality, we conclude that (102) After some simplifications, the last inequality gives the desired result, i.e., 
